Political connections and household access to bank loans:evidence from China by Li, Linyang et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Political connections and household access to bank loans





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2020
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Li, L., Hermes, N., & Lensink, R. (2020). Political connections and household access to bank loans:
evidence from China. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istrazivanja, 33(1), 288-309.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1656099
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 19-05-2020
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rero20
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
ISSN: 1331-677X (Print) 1848-9664 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rero20
Political connections and household access to
bank loans: evidence from China
Linyang Li, Niels Hermes & Robert Lensink
To cite this article: Linyang Li, Niels Hermes & Robert Lensink (2020) Political connections
and household access to bank loans: evidence from China, Economic Research-Ekonomska
Istraživanja, 33:1, 288-309, DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2019.1656099
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1656099
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 27 Feb 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 69
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Political connections and household access to bank loans:
evidence from China
Linyang Lia, Niels Hermesb and Robert Lensinkb
aSchool of Economics and Management, Northwest University, Xi’an, China; bFaculty of Economics
and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Using data from a large household survey among 8,438 households
in China in 2011, we analyse whether the fact that a household
head is a member of a political party in China increases the prob-
ability that the household has access to a bank loan. We investigate
how these connections influence the decision of households to
apply for a bank loan (i.e., the demand side) and the decision of the
bank to approve the loan (i.e., the supply side). We show that polit-
ical connections are positively associated with both the households’
willingness to apply for a loan, as well as with the probability that
they get a loan from the bank. We make two contributions to the
literature on the determinants of households’ access to credit. We
are the first to analyse the role of political connections as a deter-
minant of households’ access to bank loans. Second, we analyse the
role of political connections throughout the process of allocating
bank loans, i.e., we decompose the loan application process into the
households’ self-selection process and bank’s selection process.
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The inability to acquire bank credit prevents households from engaging in profitable
activities and diversifying their household incomes (see, e.g., Aghion & Bolton, 1997;
Boucher, Guirkinger, & Trivelli, 2009； Ghosh and Vinod, 2017; Foltz, 2004).
Households facing credit constraints also have limited possibilities of smoothing their
consumption and improving their welfare (Coleman, 1999; Karlan & Morduch, 2009;
Li, Li, Huang, & Zhu, 2013). One of the main challenges households face in obtaining
loans is that banks have imperfect information with regard to loan repayment proba-
bilities (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Households can circumvent this challenge by signal-
ing their ability to repay. One way of doing this is by putting up valuable collateral
(Bester, 1985). Yet, for many households, especially the poorer, this is difficult
because they lack the assets the bank is willing to accept as collateral. Households
therefore need to develop other ways to reduce the barriers to obtain credit.
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In this article, we add to literature investigating the determinants of household credit
constraints by focusing on political connections of household members. First, we argue
that such connections may increase households’ confidence in getting a loan, which
increases the probability they will also apply for a loan. Second, being a party member
allows a household head to develop private relationships with bank officers, potentially
providing additional information about the creditworthiness of the household. This may
positively affect their decisions about extending loans. Although the importance of polit-
ical connections for firms in obtaining bank credit has been established (see, e.g., Cheng,
2018; Faccio, 2006; Feng, Johansson, & Zhang, 2015; Houston, Jiang, Lin, & Ma, 2014;
Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Kung & Ma, 2018; Zhou, 2009), to the best of our knowledge, the
value of political connections for households has not yet been studied.
To investigate the role of political connections as a determinant of households’
access to credit, we use data from a large household survey carried out in China. The
data set includes information about the membership of a household head of the rul-
ing political party of China. This information allows us to analyse whether party
membership increases the probability of households having access to a bank loan. We
investigate the role of political connections at sequential stages of the bank loan allo-
cation process. More specifically, we examine how these connections influence house-
holds’ decisions to apply for bank loans and how they influence banks’ decisions to
approve loans. On the demand side, households with political connections may self-
select when applying for loans: because of their connections, they may be more confi-
dent than non-connected households about obtaining loans. On the supply side,
banks may use information about political connections as a screening device when
allocating loans. Only a few studies investigate the determinants of households’ access
to bank loans by separating the decisions of households to apply (i.e., the demand
side) and the decisions of banks to approve applications (i.e., the supply side) (see,
e.g., Chakravarty & Xiang, 2009; Cole & Sokolyk, 2016). Yet, none of these studies
takes into account the role of household political connections.
The data set we use is based on a survey of 8,438 households in China, carried out in
2011 by the People’s Bank of China (the central bank of China) and Southwestern
University of Economics and Finance. The survey covers the economic and financial
activities of Chinese households in 2010. Using a two-stage Heckman probit model to
examine the separate decision-making processes of the demand side and the supply side,
we find that political connections are positively associated with both households’ willing-
ness to apply for loans and their probability of obtaining loans. These results suggest that
political connections are indeed important throughout the bank allocation procedure.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the
related literature and develop our hypotheses. In Section 3, we discuss the data set,
and in Section 4, we provide a description of the empirical methodology. We present
our empirical results in Section 5 and our conclusions in Section 6.
2. The importance of political connections: a review of literature
In the literature, the advantages of political connections have been investigated in the
context of (listed) firms. Firms are faced with financial constraints and limited access
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to bank loans. Several studies show that political connections can help firms obtain-
ing bank credit (Cheng, 2018; Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Faccio, 2006; Feng,
Johansson, & Zhang, 2014; Feng et al., 2015; Guo, Kun, Kim, & Xu, 2014; Infante &
Piazza, 2014; Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Kung & Ma, 2018; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee,
2006; Zhou, 2009). Such connections prove to have wide implications. For instance,
studies show that for Chinese firms, political connections facilitate the probability of
IPO approval from the central government (Chen, Guan, Zhang, & Zhao, 2017; Liu,
Tang, & Tian, 2013; Li & Zhou, 2015; Piotroski & Zhang, 2014). In addition, Chinese
firms with political connections experience a number of economic benefits during the
process of going public, such as higher offering price, lower underpricing, lower fixed
costs, preferential tax treatment, more government subsidies, and superior access to
regulated industries through corporate deals (Feng et al., 2015; Francis, Hasan, &
Sun, 2009). Feng et al. (2014) focus on Chinese listed firms; they find that political
connections contribute to firms’ post-IPO stock values and accounting performances.
These outcomes help explain why firms are encouraged to actively develop political
connections (Banerji, Duygun, & Shaban, 2018; Dong, Wei, & Zhang, 2016; Feng
et al., 2015; Yueh, 2009).
Households have difficulties in obtaining bank loans because of asymmetric
information with regard to the probability of repayment (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).
Banks do not have sufficient information about the creditworthiness of households
and often they are unwilling to invest in collecting information because of the small
sizes of the loans and the fixed-cost nature of collecting information (Beck,
B€uy€ukkarabacak, Rioja, & Valev, 2012). This may be particularly true for house-
holds in emerging and developing economies, where financial markets are less
developed and information problems are more prevalent. Households may increase
the probability of getting access to loans once they can put up valuable collateral.
However, for most households in emerging economies, it is problematic to provide
collateral.1
One alternative for these households may be to develop political connections.
Having such connections may indirectly help influencing credit allocation decisions
made by the banks. Political connections are often associated with political power,
which is still an important factor in markets of many transition economies (Asher &
Novosad, 2017; Faccio, 2006; Fisman & Wang, 2015; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). We
investigate the importance of having political connections in the context of China. In
particular, we address the question of whether and to what extent politically con-
nected households have better access to bank loan allocation. We define a household
as being politically connected when the household head is a member of the
Communist Party (the leading political party of the country) or of one of the political
parties and movements linked to the Communist Party, such as the minor democratic
parties or the Communist Youth League. Several studies document that in transition
economies the government or the ruling party exercises considerable control over key
economic resources through state-owned enterprises and involvement in financial
markets (i.e., stated-owned banks) (Chen et al., 2017; McMillan, 1997; Pan & Tian,
2017). This is also the case in China, which has a one-party political system
(Liu, 2003).
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The fact that a household head is politically affiliated with the political party may
be an indicator of the household having access to party officials such as local party
leaders, bureaucrats, and bank officers of state-owned banks. Political affiliation pro-
vides exclusive opportunities to attend political activities such as official meetings
with other Party members and to have frequent interactions with these members,
thereby enriching the household’s social network (McLaughlin, 2017). Having access
to these party officials may indicate that a household has access to larger pools of
resources associated with political networks (Cruz, Labonne, & Querubin, 2017;
Faccio & Hsu, 2017; Fafchamps & Labonne, 2017). This may reduce the reluctance of
banks to extend credit. Moreover, developing relationships with party officials may
help households overcome regulatory constraints and receive preferential treatment
from the government (Feng et al., 2014; Kung & Ma, 2018). With regard to access to
bank loans, connections to bank officers who are also party officials may be instru-
mental in more successfully negotiating access to bank loans (Dickson, 2003).2
There are three steps in the process of obtaining a bank loan (Cole & Sokolyk,
2016). First, a household must decide whether it needs (i.e., has demand for) a bank
loan. This decision may be correlated with the household’s economic characteristics
such as income status and level and propensity to consume and/or invest. Moreover,
interactions with other households, because this may increase the household’s aware-
ness of banks as a source of external finance, its knowledge of how to apply for a
loan, and its familiarity with the economic benefits of using bank credit (Li, 2018;
Okten & Osili, 2004; Wydick, Karp Hayes, & Hilliker Kempf, 2011).
Second, households in need of bank loans must decide whether they want to apply
for (i.e., demand) a bank loan. They may be discouraged to apply, once they expect
the bank will turn them down due to asymmetric information and lack of valuable
collateral. That is, they may self-select and decide not to apply. The importance of
self-selection has been shown empirically for firms. Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and
Wolken (2002) find that nearly half of small business firms are discouraged from
applying for bank loans. Chakravarty and Xiang (2009) report that one-third of small
businesses do not apply because they think loan officers will turn them down. Kon
and Storey (2003) and Han, Fraser, and Storey (2009) stress that imperfect informa-
tion is the major reason that financially constrained firms are discouraged from
applying, because most have difficulties with signaling their credibility and repayment
capability to banks. Cole and Sokolyk (2016) estimates that about 20%–50% of firms
that do not apply for loans would have been approved, suggesting that self-selection
plays an important role in determining the allocation of bank loans.
Households with political connections are more likely to become bank credit appli-
cants, because they may be more confident in passing the bank’s selection process
than households without such connections. Regular participation in political activities
enhances their opportunities to cultivate close relationships with party members such
as bank officials. Frequent contacts facilitate mutual trust and eliminate information
asymmetry problems between households and loan officers, thereby increasing the
households’ probability of getting loans (Banerji et al., 2018; Cole, 1998; Dong et al.,
2016; Feng et al., 2015). Therefore, because politically connected households may be
more motivated to apply for bank loans, we derive the following hypothesis:
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H1: Households with political connections having demand for bank loans are more likely
to apply for loans than households without such connections.
The third step in obtaining a bank loan is being screened and selected by the
bank. In this step, loan officers collect information with regard to applicants’ social
backgrounds, economic conditions, and reasons for applying for loans. One import-
ant source of information that loan officers may use in this process is their connec-
tions with loan applicants through party membership. These connections provide
additional information about the creditworthiness of applicants. Households with pol-
itical connections that are applying for loans may be in a better position to obtain
loans than households without such connections. Being a party member allows a
household head to develop private relationships (i.e., friendships) with other party
members, including bank officials, through political activities. Such private links may
enhance a household’s access to bank credit because relationships are established on
the basis of mutual trust and support. Based on these relationships, bank officials
may decide to provide (i.e., supply) credit to households with whom they are linked
through political networks. Politically connected applicants may thus gain preferential
treatment when applying for loans (Feng et al., 2014; Kung & Ma, 2018; Zhou, 2009).
We expect that applicants with political connections will be shown preferential treat-
ment in the screening process, which leads us to derive the following hypothesis:
H2: Politically connected households have a higher probability of having access to bank
loans than households without such connections.
3. Data
We use a new data set provided by Southwestern University of Economics and
Finance. The survey, known as the China Household Finance Survey (C.H.F.S.), was
conducted in 2011 by the People’s Bank of China (the central bank of China) and
Southwestern University of Economics and Finance.3 The survey employs a stratified
sampling strategy using three-stage randomisation to select interviewed households at
the national level. In the first stage, 80 counties are randomly selected from a total of
2,585 counties in 25 provinces (all mainland provinces except for Tibet, Xinjiang and
Inner Mongolia). The 80 counties cover diverse geographic regions and contain
enough observations to be a representative sample.
The second stage is to randomly select residential communities from the 80 coun-
ties. The primary purpose of the C.H.F.S. is to collect information on households’
financial activities, and because urban households are more likely involved in finan-
cial activities than rural residents, the survey oversamples the urban population.
Among the selected 320 communities, the ratio of urban to rural communities is
181:139, which meets the goal of oversampling the urban population.
In the final stage, 20 households are randomly drawn from each rural community
to be interviewed for the survey. At every stage, the probability proportion to size
method is applied, that is, all sampled counties and communities are weighted by the
population size. The final data set consists of answers from 8,438 households
across China.4
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The data set covers information on household non-financial assets, financial assets,
debt, insurance, social welfare, income, and expenditure. Moreover, it gathers infor-
mation on household members’ demographic and work characteristics, including gen-
der, age, marriage status, educational attainment, ethnicity, political affiliation,
occupation, salary, and involvement in agricultural and commercial activities.5 It also
includes data on whether a household needed bank credit, whether a household
decided to apply for bank financing, and whether the bank accepted the household’s
loan application. This information allows us to explicitly distinguish between the
household’s loan application and the bank’s loan approval decision. This is a clear
advantage of our data set compared with other data sets that have been used to ana-
lyse the determinants of access to loans for households and/or firms. The questions
on loan application and loan approval are available only for a sub-sample of the
selected households, that is, those that are involved in agricultural and/or commercial
activities. The sub-sample we use in the analysis consists of 3,858 households.
Two questions in the survey enable us to identify a household’s bank credit status.
The first question asks whether the interviewed household has a bank loan for com-
mercial and agricultural activities. Households that answer ‘yes’ are labelled as mem-
bers of the group of households that need a bank loan, have applied for a loan, and
have successfully obtained it. Households that answer ‘no’ indicate their reasons for
not having bank loans in a second question. This second question has four optional
answers: (1) ‘I don’t need a bank loan’; (2) ‘I had a bank loan before and I paid it
off’; (3) ‘I need a bank loan but I never applied’; or (4) ‘I applied for a bank loan but
was rejected’. Based on answers to the second question, we group households
as follows:
 Households choosing option (1) are those that do not need a bank loan;
 Households choosing option (2) are those that need a bank loan;
 Households choosing option (3) are those that need a bank loan but decided not
to apply; and
 Households choosing option (4) are those that need bank credit and applied for a
loan but were rejected.
As illustrated in Figure 1, we use the above two questions to identify households
in the three stages of the bank credit application procedure. Specifically, in the first
stage, the sample of 3,858 households is sub-divided into a group that needs a bank
loan and a group that does not. In the second stage, households in need of bank
loans decide whether or not to apply. At this stage, we divide households into those
that apply and those that do not. In the third stage, loan officers screen applicants;
those who meet the banks’ eligibility criteria are granted loans and the others
are rejected.
Figure 1 shows that about one-third of the households in the sample say they need
bank loans. However, more than half of these households (54%) did not apply for a
loan. This indicates that compared with non-applying small businesses, Chinese
households show a high probability of not applying for loans (Brown, Jappelli, &
Pagano, 2009; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Chakravarty & Xiang, 2009; Cole & Sokolyk,
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2016). Of those that did not apply, 51% state that their reason for not applying is
that their chances of getting accepted are minimal. This suggests they lack confidence
that they will be successful in passing bank selection processes; 24% say they are dis-
couraged by the bank’s documentation requirements, 13% say they lack knowledge
with respect to the application procedure, and 22% give other reasons.
Of those households that applied, 68% received loans. The survey includes a ques-
tion that focuses on those households that applied for a bank loan but were rejected,
asking them about the reasons for their failure to pass the screening process. More
than 35% of rejected households state they were unsuccessful because they did not
have a guarantee from a wealthy individual or company; 32% say their income was
too low; 26% report that they lacked collateral; and 17% say they did not have a per-
sonal relationship with the loan officer. Therefore, households’ subjective beliefs of
why they were not granted bank loans can be ascribed to either poor economic con-
ditions (i.e., income, collateral) or poor social relationships (i.e., guarantees from
others, relationships with loan officers). The latter explanation is consistent with
results from previous studies of social capital, showing that borrowers who are more
engaged in social activities and have broader social networks are more likely to be
granted bank loans (Banerji et al., 2018; Dong et al., 2016; Dufhues, Buchenrieder, &
Munkung, 2013; Feng et al., 2015; Okten & Osili, 2004; Wydick et al., 2011).
Households that obtained loans confirm the importance of the borrower–bank
relationship. The survey contains a question asking these households about their
Figure 1. Bank credit allocation procedure.
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reasons for choosing a particular bank to apply for a loan. Most households answer
they have no alternatives (24%) and/or the bank is located nearby (24%); 23% state
that their main reason is that they have business contacts with the bank and/or per-
sonal relationships with bank officials.
4. Empirical methodology
An unbiased investigation of the determinants of bank loan allocation should take
into account both the bank’s decision-making stage (i.e., the supply side) and the
household’s decision-making process (i.e., the demand side). Yet, the decision of
households to apply for a loan is rarely taken into account in empirical studies (Cole
& Sokolyk, 2016; Han et al., 2009), because data describing these decisions is often
not available. Fortunately, our data includes information allowing us to explicitly take
into account household decision making with respect to loan applications. We are
therefore able to explicitly examine the role of political connections in the house-
hold’s self-selection process (combining both the household’s need stage and applica-
tion stage), as well as their role in the bank’s selection process (denoting the bank’s
decision on credit approval among applicants).
It is important to explicitly take into account the different stages of the bank loan
allocation process, because a simple comparison of the incidence of bank loan acqui-
sition between politically connected and non-connected households may lead to
biased results (Li et al., 2007). In our empirical analysis, we create three binary varia-
bles. The first is Need Bank Loan, which equals 1 when a household reports it is in
need of bank credit and 0 otherwise. The second binary variable, Bank Loan Applied,
captures a household’s decision to apply, which equals 1 for households that need a
loan and decide to apply and 0 for households that need a loan but do not apply.
The third binary variable, Bank Loan Granted, exhibits the bank’s selection decision;
it equals 1 for households that apply for and successfully obtain a loan and 0 for
households that apply but are rejected. We use these three binary variables to decom-
pose the loan allocation by the bank into the self-selection process of households and
the selection process of banks, and examine what role political connections play in
both processes.
To examine the determinants of the households’ self-selection process, we need to
take into account both the first stage (identifying household demand for bank credit)
and the second stage (specifying household decision to apply), because the decision
to apply is conditional on whether a household needs bank credit. Conducting a sim-
ple probit regression using a sample that covers only households that are in need of
bank credit may lead to biased outcomes, because the households in the sample may
not be randomly selected (Coady & Parker, 2009; Heckman, 1979). Unobserved fac-
tors may influence both a household’s need for a loan and its decision to apply. To
control for possible sample selection bias, we apply the Heckman probit model (Das,
2015; Van de Ven & van Praag, 1981) and identify the selection equation and out-
come equation as follows:
Need Bank Crediti ¼ a1 þ b1Political Connectioni þ Xibþ di: (1)
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Bank Loan Applyj ¼ a2 þ h1Political Connectionj þ Yjh2 þMill’s Ratio1þ ej: (2)
Selection Equation (1) is a simple probit model estimating the propensity of house-
hold i (¼ 1, 2, … , 3,858) needing a bank loan. Political Connection is the variable of
primary interest. It has the value 1 if the household head is member of the
Communist Party or one of the political parties and movements linked to it (e.g., the
minor democratic parties and the Youth League) and 0 otherwise. Xi is a vector of
control variables that affects household i’s need for bank credit. b1 and b are parame-
ters to be estimated, a1 is the constant, and di denotes the error term. The outcome
Equation (2) is also a probit model estimating the probability for household j (¼ 1, 2,
… , 975) to apply for a loan, conditional on the need for bank credit: Yi, h1, h, a2,
and ei are analogous to Xi, b1, b, a1, and di in the selection Equation (1). Both ei
and di are assumed to be standard normal distributed.
As mentioned above, unobserved factors may influence both Need Bank Crediti
and Bank Loan Applyi, because the sample used in the estimations may not be ran-
domly selected. If the simple probit model is employed to estimate Equation (2), the
endogeneity problem may arise because the error terms of two equations may be cor-
related (corr (di, ej) ¼ q1 6¼ 0). The Heckman probit model addresses the sample
selection bias by estimating the Inverse Mill’s ratio, which is based on the correlation
between error terms di and ej (q1) and adding to the outcome equation as an inde-
pendent variable to Equation (2). The extent to which the analysis suffers from sam-
ple selection is reflected in the significance level of the Inverse Mill’s ratio. If the
Inverse Mill’s ratio is significant, it denotes that the null hypothesis of q¼ 0 is
rejected, and a selection bias exists in the decision-making process. Since our depend-
ent variable in the outcome equation is a discrete choice variable, we apply the
Heckman probit model instead of the ordinary least squares version of the model.
One important feature of the Heckman selection strategy is that the two-step
model must be estimated using one or more exclusion variables to estimate the selec-
tion equation; these variables should not be included in the outcome equation
(Heckman & Navarro-Lozano, 2004). In the household’s self-selection process, the
exclusion variable(s) should be associated with the household’s need for a bank loan,
but not with the household’s decision to apply. As our exclusion variable, we take the
percentage of households having bank account living in the same community as the
responding household. This variable signals the probability households in a commu-
nity interact with other households in the community having a bank account. Such
interaction may increase their awareness of banks as a source of external finance,
their knowledge of how to apply for a loan, and their familiarity with the economic
benefits of using bank credit (Okten & Osili, 2004; Wydick et al., 2011). This may
stimulate their demand for bank credit.
To examine the validity of our exclusion variable, we use a simple probit model to
check its associations with Need Bank Credit and Bank Loan Apply. The results con-
firm that the percentage of households in the community having a bank account is
positive and strongly significant in the model for Need Bank Credit, while it is insig-
nificant in the model for Bank Loan Apply. Accordingly, we argue that the exclusion
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variable exerts no impact on a household’s decision to apply for bank credit in our
estimations.
When deciding to approve loans to new or existing clients, banks collect informa-
tion on economic performance and potential repayment capacity to verify which
applicants satisfy the eligibility criteria for granting a loan. Similar to the self-selection
process, the sample of households applying for a loan may be non-randomly selected,
if unobserved factors influence both a household’s decision to apply and the bank’s
decision to approve the loan. Therefore, we again employ the Heckman probit model
when examining the bank’s selection process:
Bank Loan Applyj ¼ a3 þ c1Political Connectionj þ Yjc2 þMill’s Ratio1þ ej: (3)
Bank Loan Grantedk ¼ a4 þ l1Political Connectionk þ Zkl2 þMill’s Ratio2þ rk:
(4)
Equation (3) specifies the selection equation and is similar to Equation (2), and
Equation (4) is the outcome equation. The model specification investigating the
bank’s selection process is similar to the model investigating the household’s self-
selection process, with two exceptions. First, because a household’s decision to apply
is conditional on the need for a loan, we keep the Inverse Mill’s ratio of the self-
selection process (Mill’s Ratio1) in the selection Equation (3) as a regressor. Second,
because sample selection is also at stake in the bank’s selection process, we calculate
the Inverse Mill’s ratio of selection Equation (3) based on q2 (corr (ej, rk)) and
adopt the outcome Equation (4) as an additional regressor (Mill's Ratio2).
The exclusion variable we use in the estimations of the bank’s selection process is
a measure of the household head’s evaluation of the safety and security of the area in
which the household resides (Public Security Evaluation). In the survey, household
heads are asked to grade the safety in the area in which the household lives on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from 1–5 (where 1 is very dangerous and 5 is very safe).
We expect household heads who believe they live in safe environments to show a
higher propensity of applying for loans, because they are less worried about unex-
pected shocks such as assault, robbery, and theft that threaten their businesses and
their ability to repay. At the same time, these beliefs are not expected to influence
bank decisions with regard to approving loans for two reasons. First, throughout the
bank credit application procedure, loan officers do not ask for the applicant’s evalu-
ation of the safety of their neighborhood. Second, households generally apply for
credit at local bank branches, and local loan officers are quite familiar with social
environment and security conditions in the neighborhood. Hence, in the screening
process, loan officers allocate funding based on applicant’s socioeconomic characteris-
tics, trustworthiness, repayment capabilities, and the potential risks of their projects,
rather than subjective security evaluation because all local applicants are living in the
same environment.6
To capture the role of political connections in the household’s self-selection pro-
cess and the bank’s selection process, we control for a large number of variables that
capture households’ demographic, economic conditions, and financial characteristics.
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Our choice of controls is based on previous studies on the determinants of the
demand and supply of bank loans. In particular, we control for demographic charac-
teristics (gender, age education and occupation of the household head, household
size, and household location), economic conditions (the household’s income, wealth,
liquid assets, and house ownership), and financial characteristics (household’s bor-
rowing from informal financial sources and the household head’s subjective attitude
towards risk).7
When estimating the models, we use the following econometric strategy. First, we
acknowledge that there are significant differences in the economic, financial and
social environment across different regions in China (Liu, 2003). Therefore, in all
regression models we use robust standard errors adjusted for clustering observations
at the community level.8 Second, because the data set we use is a cross-sectional
stratified random sample, each household is endowed with a sampling weight repre-
senting the selection probability to obtain results that are representative for all house-
holds in China (Cole & Sokolyk, 2016). Third, in all tests, we calculate regression
coefficients as average marginal effects using the finite-difference method.9 This
means that the parameter of each independent variable can be interpreted as the
probability for the dependent variable to be equal to 1. Finally, we acknowledge that
because we use cross-sectional data, we cannot rule out the possibility that our speci-
fication suffers from unobserved heterogeneity. However, by using an IV approach,
we are able to control for reverse causality and/or omitted variable bias.
5. Descriptive statistics and empirical results
Panel A of Table 1 shows the univariate analysis of the households’ need of a bank
loan using the full sample. Column (1) provides the means and standard deviations
(in parentheses) of all variables for the households in our sample. Politically con-
nected household heads account for 12.3% of the total sample.10 The table also shows
that 26% of households have loans from the informal financial sector; yet, only 7.8%
has a bank loan (7.8%). This suggests that it is difficult for households to access bank
loans in China, and they therefore rely more on lending through informal finan-
cial channels.
Columns (2) and (3) of Panel A show the means and standard deviations of all
variables for the sub-sample of households that need a bank loan and the sub-sample
that do not need a loan. Column (4) of the table shows results of the t-test to exam-
ine whether the mean values of variables are statistically significantly different for the
two sub-samples of households. Sample weights are adopted in the estimation of the
t-test, and robust standard errors are clustered at the community level. The results
show that although the sub-sample of households in need of a loan is more politically
connected than the sub-sample of households without the need, the difference
between the mean values for this variable is not statistically significant.
Panel B of Table 1 provides information on the sub-sample of households that say
they need a bank loan. Column (1) provides the descriptive statistics of this sub-sam-
ple; the information in this column is equal to that in Column (3) in Panel A of
Table 1. Columns (2) and (3) show the means and standard deviations of variables
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for households that do not apply and for households that do apply for a bank loan,
respectively. Column (4) shows results of the t-test that compares the mean values of
variables for both sub-samples. Most importantly for the discussion in this article, the
table shows that for households that apply for loans, 18.3% have political connections,
which is significantly higher than the percentage of households that do not apply
(8.0%). This suggests that politically connected households in need of bank credit are
significantly more motivated to apply for loans than households without such
connections.
Panel C focuses on those households that have applied for a loan. This sub-sample
is further separated into a sub-sample of those that were not granted a loan (Column
[2]) versus those that did obtain a loan from the bank (Column [3]). Results from a
simple t-test (Column [4]) show that households that received a loan have a signifi-
cantly higher probability of being politically connected compared to households that
did not obtain a loan (22.9% versus 9%).
Column (1) of Table 2 shows the results of selection Equation (1), investigating
the likelihood that a household needs a bank credit. The exclusion variable,
Percentage Households Having a Bank Account, is significant at the 10% level. The
Wald test of the Selection Equation (1) is significant at the 1% level, which strongly
rejects the null-hypothesis that q1 ¼ 0, indicating the existence of sample selec-
tion bias.
Most importantly, the results in Column (1) of Table 2 show that the coefficient
for the variable Political Connection is not statistically significant, suggesting that the
fact that the household head is politically connected is not associated with the house-
hold’s need for a loan. Apparently, political connections do not increase the demand
for bank loans.
Column (2) of Table 2 provides the results of the analysis in which we investigate
the determinants of applying for a loan, conditional on whether households say they
Table 1. Univariate analyses.
Panel A: Univariate analysis of bank loan need
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All HHs No Need Need T-Test
3,850 2,875 975 3,850
Political Connection 0.123 0.120 0.127 0.0157
(0.328) (0.326) (0.334) (0.0348)
Panel B: Univariate analysis of bank loan application
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Needing HHs Discouraged Applied T-Test
975 528 447 975
Political Connection 0.127 0.080 0.183 0.214***
(0.334) (0.270) (0.390) (0.0615)
Panel C: Univariate analysis of bank loan approval
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Applied HHs Rejected HHs Approved HHs T-Test
447 145 302 447
Political Connection 0.183 0.090 0.229 0.227***
(0.390) (0.289) (0.422) (0.0542)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses of columns (1), (2) and (3); robust standard errors in parentheses of col-
umn (4) are adjusted for 320 clusters in community. Sample weight is adopted in the estimation of the T-test
(p< 0.1, p< 0.05, p< 0.01).
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Table 2. Heckman probit model of the self-selection process.
(1) (2) (3)
Selection Equation Outcome Equation
Outcome Equation
(Marginal Effect)
Explanatory Variables Need Bank Credit (¼1) Bank Loan Apply (¼1) Bank Loan Apply (¼1)
Political Connection 0.0107 0.217 0.0369
(0.0995) (0.110) (0.0176)
Social-Economic Characteristics (Age reference group: Young Heads)
Female 0.0634 0.199 0.0393
(0.0803) (0.0966) (0.0206)
Middle-aged 0.213 0.00342 0.000634
(0.129) (0.138) (0.0256)
Old 0.0694 0.0830 0.0151
(0.145) (0.140) (0.0253)
Household Size 0.0274 0.0108 0.00200
(0.0179) (0.0218) (0.00402)
Rural 0.279 0.196 0.0348
(0.0796) (0.0959) (0.0160)









Occupation Types (Reference group: Unemployed)
Freelance or Farmer 0.0343 0.0809 0.0151
(0.0748) (0.0940) (0.0178)
Entrepreneur 0.0112 0.191 0.0323
(0.145) (0.187) (0.0290)
Employee 0.0757 0.110 0.0196
(0.103) (0.119) (0.0207)
Household Income (Reference group: Low-Income Class)
Middle-Income Class 0.0507 0.0205 0.00381
(0.0734) (0.0883) (0.0164)
Top-Income Class 0.0683 0.113 0.0203
(0.0988) (0.114) (0.0200)





Top-Durable-Value Level 0.142 0.374 0.0617
(0.0967) (0.117) (0.0177)





Top-Liquid-Value Level 0.153 0.0716 0.0130
(0.0911) (0.121) (0.0213)
Real Estate
Own House 0.0290 0.00991 0.00185
(0.140) (0.171) (0.0321)
Financial Characteristics
Informal Lending 1.001 0.847 0.197
(0.0626) (0.0719) (0.0189)














N 3,776 961 961
(continued)
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need a bank loan. The results show that Political Connection is statistically significant
and has a positive sign (p< 0.01), indicating that politically connected households are
more likely to apply for a bank loan than households without such connections. This
result confirms our Hypothesis 1. We interpret this as evidence for the argument that
households with political connections self-select when applying for a loan, because
they are more confident about obtaining a loan through their connections. As a
robustness check, we present in Column (3) the results of a simple probit estimation
model (e.g., not controlling for selection bias) of the model in Column (2).
Compared with the Heckman probit model, Political Connection is again positive and
significant.
Table 3 displays the results of the investigation focusing on the selection process
applied by banks to screen loan applications. Column (1) shows results that describe
households’ decisions to apply for bank loans, similar to the results in Column (2) of
Table 2 with two exceptions. First, to control for the sample selection bias in the self-
selection process, we add the Inverse Mill’s ratio from the household’s self-selection
equation (Mill’s Ratio1) as an additional regressor. Second, we use the household
head’s subjective attitude towards the public safety of the living environment (Public
Security Evaluation) as the exclusion variable in the bank loan application equation
presented in Column (1). The results show that Public Security Evaluation is statistic-
ally significant. They also show that both the Mill’s Ratio1 and the Wald test of the
bank selection process are significant. This rejects the null-hypothesis of q2 ¼ 0, and
confirms the existence of the sample selection bias in the household’s self-selection
process and the bank’s selection process.
The results in Column (1) of Table 3 are consistent with the results in Column (2)
of Table 2. Household heads with political connections have a higher probability of
applying for a bank loan when they show the need for a loan. As discussed above,
this may be driven by the confidence they have that these connections will help them
obtain a loan.
Column (2) of Table 3 shows the results of the bank’s screening process. The coef-
ficient of the variable Political Connection is statistically significant and has a positive
sign, suggesting that politically connected households are more likely to be approved
Table 2. Continued.
(1) (2) (3)
Selection Equation Outcome Equation
Outcome Equation
(Marginal Effect)
Explanatory Variables Need Bank Credit (¼1) Bank Loan Apply (¼1) Bank Loan Apply (¼1)
q1 0.9724 –
(0.0368) –
v2 (Wald test of q1¼ 0) 10.01 –





Sample Weight Adopted Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for 320 clusters in community. In column (3), Average
Marginal Effects are calculated with finite-difference method. Sample weight is adopted in all estimations of the
model (p< 0.01, p< 0.05, p< 0.1).
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Table 3. Heckman probit model of the bank selection process.
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory Variables Selection Equation (2)
Outcome
Equation (2) Simple Probit





Political Connection 0.386 0.302 0.0633
(0.165) (0.187) (0.0357)
Social-Economic Characteristics (Age reference group: Young Heads)
Female 0.441 0.207 0.0456
(0.151) (0.187) (0.0379)
Middle-aged 0.189 0.258 0.0564
(0.294) (0.241) (0.0483)
Old 0.134 0.411 0.107
(0.237) (0.265) (0.0755)
Household Size 0.0355 0.0798 0.0187
(0.0436) (0.0483) (0.0119)
Rural 0.586 0.0443 0.0103
(0.256) (0.172) (0.0395)
Educational Attainment (Reference group: Primary School or less)
Middle School or Vocational School 0.159 0.199 0.0472
(0.139) (0.144) (0.0345)
Bachelor’s degree or Above 1.283 0.672 0.113
(0.642) (0.476) (0.0538)
Occupation Types (Reference group: Unemployed)
Freelance or Farmer 0.157 0.0593 0.0139
(0.138) (0.194) (0.0457)
Entrepreneur 0.466 0.592 0.105
(0.264) (0.444) (0.0554)
Employee 0.0861 0.0431 0.0102
(0.189) (0.205) (0.0492)
Household Income (Reference group: Low-Income Class)
Middle-Income Class 0.0103 0.150 0.0349
(0.133) (0.156) (0.0362)
Top-Income Class 0.0667 0.475 0.0988
(0.164) (0.213) (0.0414)
Durable Goods Value (Reference group: Low-Durable-Value Level)
Middle-Durable-Value Level 0.369 0.0703 0.0165
(0.147) (0.168) (0.0397)
Top-Durable-Value Level 0.844 0.0135 0.00315
(0.213) (0.229) (0.0533)
Liquid Assets Value (Reference group: Low-Liquid-Value Level)
Middle-Liquid-Value Level 0.259 0.0603 0.0143
(0.189) (0.167) (0.0403)
Top-Liquid-Value Level 0.338 0.186 0.0462
(0.200) (0.190) (0.0498)
Real Estate
Own House 0.0328 0.495 0.139
(0.259) (0.377) (0.126)
Financial Characteristics
Informal Lending 2.744 0.0488 0.0114
(0.949) (0.136) (0.0320)
Risk Preference 0.0116 0.0379 0.00888
(0.0846) (0.0526) (0.0123)
Exclusion Variables
Public Security Evaluation 0.283 – –
(0.0638) – –




NO. of Observations 961 441 441
q2 0.8394
(continued)
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for a bank loan than households without such connections, which supports our
Hypothesis 2. Such connections provide additional information about the credit-
worthiness of applicants. This puts households with political connections that apply
for a loan in a better position to actually obtain a loan than households without con-
nections. Such connections allow for developing private relationships (i.e., friend-
ships) with other Party members, including bank officials. Private links may enhance
households’ accessibility to bank credit because friendships are established on the
basis of mutual trust and support. Bank officials may decide to provide (i.e., supply)
credit to households with whom they are linked as a form of friendly assistance.
Politically connected applicants may thus gain preferential treatment when applying
for a loan.
As a robustness check, in Column (3) of Table 3, we use a simple probit model
and re-estimate the model displayed in Column (2). The most important outcome of
this exercise is that Political Connection remains statistically significant and has the
expected sign.
6. Conclusion
In this article, we investigate the role that household political connections play in
determining household access to bank loans. We use data from a large household
survey carried out in China to analyse whether membership of a household head in a
political party in China increases the probability that the household has access to a
bank loan. We investigate the role of political connections at different stages of the
bank loan allocation process. More specifically, we look at how these connections
influence the decisions of households to apply for bank loans and the decisions of
banks to approve the loans. Households with political connections may self-select
when applying for loans because they are more confident of obtaining loans through
their connections. Banks may use information about political connections as a screen-
ing device when allocating loans. Our data come from a large survey covering 8,438
households in China, carried out by the Survey and Research Center of China
Household Finance in 2012 and covering the economic and financial activities of
Chinese households in 2011. Using the two-stage Heckman probit model in both the
Table 3. Continued.
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory Variables Selection Equation (2)
Outcome
Equation (2) Simple Probit






v2 (Wald test of q2 ¼ 0) 8.47 –








Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for 320 clusters in community. Average Marginal Effects
are calculated with finite-difference method. Sample weight is adopted in all estimations of the model (p< 0.01,p< 0.05, p< 0.1).
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household’s self-selection process and the bank’s selection process, we find evidence
that political connections are positively associated with both households’ willingness
to apply for a loan on the demand side and their probability of obtaining a loan on
the supply side. These results thus confirm our hypotheses.
We make two contributions to literature on the determinants of household access
to credit. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyse the role of
political connections as a determinant of household access to bank loans. Second, we
analyse the role of political connections throughout the bank loan allocation process,
that is, we decompose the loan application process into the household’s self-selection
process and bank’s selection process. The separate discussion of different stages of the
bank loan allocation process enables us to analyse the impact of political connection
on both the credit demand and credit supply side.
Because we use cross-sectional data, it is impossible to investigate the impact of
changes in the variable of interest; that is, analysing the impact of the acquisition or
loss of political connections. Moreover, we are unable to observe the decision-making
process of the bank loan allocation procedure over time. Future research should focus
on creating panel data to allow further investigation of these issues.
Notes
1. For instance, land is a traditional and prevalent form of collateral in developing countries
when applying for bank credit. In the case of China, however, land is state-owned
property by law and households are not allowed to use it as collateral (Park & Ren,
2001). This exacerbates the difficulty for households in accessing bank credit.
2. One potential concern may be that households realise that having political connections
enhances their access to bank credit. Therefore, they may attain the political affiliation as
a shortcut to get access to credit. If this is what really happens, our analysis cannot prove
that political connected households are motivated by their political memberships to apply
for bank credit. Nevertheless, as described by Li et al. (2008), the attainment of Party
membership in China follows a distinct selection process that generally involves five
stages: self-selection, political participation, daily monitoring, closed-door evaluation, and
probationary examination. This distinct process generally takes three or four years,
during which the candidate must make a continuous effort to meet the standard of being
a party member, such as regular report to the party branch and a good performance in
the working field. The candidate is afforded a membership only when all party members
in the local branch have no doubt on the candidate’s evaluation. Accordingly, attaining
the party membership is much more costly with respect to time and effort than applying
for bank credit. It is less likely that people attain the party membership with the aim of
obtaining bank credit.
3. Detailed information on the survey design and data collection is described by Gan
et al. (2014).
4. The data set has recently been used in several empirical studies; see; e.g., Lu and Turvey
(2014), Zhu, Du, and Zhang (2014), Liang and Guo (2015), Chen and Wen (2017) and
Li (2018).
5. For the English version of the questionnaire, see http://www.chfsdata.org/upload/CHFS-
Questionnaire-CAPI-English.pdf.
6. Again, we conduct simple probit models using selection Equation (3) and outcome
Equation (4) and adding Public Security Evaluation to both regression models. Results
confirm that Public Security Evaluation and Bank Loan Apply are positively and
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statistically significantly associated, but Public Security Evaluation and Bank Loan
Granted are not.
7. Appendix Table A.1 describes the measurement of all control variables we use in
the analysis.
8. In our sample, we have data from 320 communities in 25 provinces. The large number
of communities ensures the effectiveness of clustering standard errors in our model.
9. According to the finite difference method, the numerical derivative of each variable is the
mean derivative of the sample rather than the derivatives evaluated at the mean of the
variable. That is, we calculate the derivative (or the finite difference for binary variables)
for each observation and report the (weighted) sample mean (Heckman et al., 2003).
10. According to the Xinhua News Agency (the official press agency of the People’s Republic
of China), in 2010 the number of Communist Party members was 80.269 million; the
total number of minor democratic party members and Youth League members was
estimated to be 80 million. Given that the total Chinese population in 2010 is estimated
at 1.339 billion, the actual share of individuals who have a party membership is 12%.
This suggests that our sample is representative of the total Chinese population in terms
of party membership.
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Appendix Table A.1. Description of control variables
Control Variables Description
Social-Economic Characteristics
Female Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household head is female
Young Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household head is under 30-years-old
Middle-Aged Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household head is 30- to 60-years-old
Old Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household head is over 60-years-old
Household Size Number of household members
Rural Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household lives in rural area
Educational Attainment
Primary School or less Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household head highest level of education is primary
school or lower
Middle School or Vocational School Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household head highest level of education is middle
or vocational school
Bachelor’s degree or Above Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household head highest level of education is
Bachelor’s degree or higher
Occupation Types
Unemployed Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household head is unemployed
Freelance or Farmer Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household head is farmer or has no regular job
Entrepreneur Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household head is entrepreneur
Employee Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household head is employee at private or
public company
Household Income
Low-Income Class Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household income is in the 1st to 25th percentile of
household incomes
Middle-Income Class Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household income is in the 26th to 74th percentile of
household incomes
Top-Income Class Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household income is in the 75th to 100th percentile
of household incomes
Durable Goods Value, based on the market value of durable goods such as televisions, refrigerators,
computers, etc.
Low-Durable-Goods Value Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household durable goods value is in the 1st to 25th
percentile of household durable goods value
Middle-Durable-Goods Value Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household durable goods value is in the 26st to 74th
percentile of household durable goods value
Top-Durable-Goods Value Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household durable goods value is in the 75st to 100th
percentile of household durable goods value
Liquid Assets Value based on the value of bank accounts, market value of stocks, amount of money lent to
others, and cash held at home
Low-Liquid-Assets Value Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household liquid assets value is in the 1st to 25th
percentile of household liquid assets value
Middle-Liquid-Assets Value Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household liquid assets value is in the 26st to 74th
percentile of household liquid assets value
Top-Liquid-Assets Value Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household liquid assets value is in the 75st to 100th
percentile of household liquid assets value
Real Estate
Owns House Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household owns a house (i.e., has officially certified
property right)
Financial Characteristics
Informal Lending Dummy variable ¼ 1 if household borrows from informal sources, such as
relatives, friends, or non-bank financial institutions
Risk Preference Measure of household head’s subjective attitude towards risk, based on a
question that captures the risk preferences of household heads. The
question is: ‘If you have some idle assets, would you like to invest in a
project that is: (1) the least risky and the least profitable; (2) relatively less
risky and less profitable; (3) neither lower, nor riskier and profitable; (4)
relatively riskier and more profitable; or (5) the riskiest and the most
profitable?’ Answers from (1) to (5) classify household heads into five
groups, ranging from the most risk-averse to the most risk-seeking; the
higher the score of the variable Risk Preference, the higher the risk the
household head prefers.
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